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Chapter 5 
 
A Perspective from the Middle East: Governance and the problem of knowledge 
 
 
Nida Alahmad1 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Is there a critical regional perspective from the Middle East on global governance? Focusing on 
the politics of the Middle East and the largest and oldest regional governance body - the Arab 
League, this chapter argues that while it is possible to speak about a ‘global’ or a ‘regional’ 
governance structure, speaking of a critical regional perspective is not possible. This is due to 
three reasons that are connected to the problem of the construction of knowledge. First, there is 
the problem of governance as a technology of ordering the world that requires the production of 
abstracted forms of knowledge about the objects that it tries to act upon. Second, a regional 
governance structure, might give an appearance of a coherent perspective through the policies 
and decisions of a governance body. However, this is not a critical perspective as it hardly 
reflects the perspective of the populations governed. While a region may seem like a coherent 
unit through policies and decisions of regional governance bodies, regional politics and life, 
which are the source of the critique, are not as clearly defined and thus cannot produce a 
unitary or coherent perspective. Third, a cultural (counter) perspective on governance is also 
extremely difficult to determine. This is because global governance is a techno-political rather 
than a geo-cultural form of ordering and perceiving the world. In the following sections, these 
three claims will be explained and expanded upon. At the most basic level a critical perspective 
that would reflect the demands, aspirations and cultural manifestations of the populations that 
                                                        
1 The author would like to thank André Bank, Andrea Teti, Anna Triandafyllidou and the anonymous reviewer of 
this volume for reading earlier drafts of this chapter and providing insightful and helpful comments. The final 
version of this piece has benefited from Robert Vitalis’s critical reading and suggestions.  
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are governed, is one that can only be reflected through politics rather than perspectives that are 
channeled and produced by regional governance bodies. 
 
The arguments extended in this chapter are mostly apparent in the context of the Middle East, 
although by no means should they suggest a regional exceptionalism. The non-exceptionalism 
of the Middle East shall be clear through comparative examples with other regions based on the 
works in this volume. At the same time, the main argument of this chapter, that a critical 
regional perspective is not possible to extract through regional governance bodies, but rather 
through empirical daily political lives of the governed, is mostly visible in the Middle East. 
This is due to the fact that the region has low integration levels and is currently witnessing a 
radical reconfiguration of power relations. This transitional moment means that regional 
governance structures are also witnessing a moment of reconfiguration and contestation over 
their function, meaning, and scope of governance. 
 
5.2 The Current State of Affairs - The Arab Spring and the Iraqi experience as 
historical junctures in governance 
 
A series of uprisings in 2011 across the Arab Middle East demanding political reforms and 
social justice, that came to be known as the Arab Spring2 have been one of the catalysts for the 
this reconfiguration. While the full ramifications of the Arab Spring are yet to be known, it 
marked the entry of the region into a pronounced struggle to redefine regional power dynamics 
through a series of proxy wars3, inter-state interventions, and the emergence of numerous 
                                                        
2 A comprehensive historical account of these uprisings that details their composition, political makeup and 
organization is yet to be written. However, for a collection of accounts of issues related to the Arab Spring and 
attempt to explain aspects of this phenomenon see McMurray and Ufheil-Somers (2013), Lynch (2014) and 
Gerges (2014). 
3 The region has witnessed a number of proxy wars in the past 40 years in which regional and international powers 
compete for regional influence through providing financial, logistical or political support and occasionally 
physically participating in armed conflicts in a third country. For example, and most famously, the Lebanese civil 
war (1975-1990) was fueled by Iranian, Syrian, Israeli and Arab Gulf interventions. More recently, Iraq and Syria 
offer prime examples in which major regional powers, such as Iran, Turkey and Arab Gulf countries, compete for 
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influential Islamist non-state-actors that in extreme cases rival states’ control over means of 
violence and control of territory. These regional struggles were/ are animated by national 
dynamics. At one extreme there is the Syrian civil war (2011-present), which has been 
responsible for massive destruction of towns and cities, deaths among civilians and one of the 
biggest refugee crises in current history.4 On the other extreme, there is the Tunisian experience 
of national governance renegotiation through constitutional reforms and electoral 
democratization. Between these two extremes, deliberations and experiments with national and 
regional governance arrangements continue to take place.5   
 
If the Arab Spring has ushered, among other things, a wave of governance re-design at the 
national levels, Iraq provided an example (to avoid) for these attempts to redesign political life 
and governance methods. Between 2003 and 2006, Iraq witnessed a massive governance 
experiment in a period of transition. The Iraqi example is useful to consider in order to 
illustrate the first problem that is of concern in this chapter: that of knowledge abstraction in 
governance practices. While the Iraqi case is a national case, not a regional one, its 
consequences, the lessons learned, and the expertise that has been built, have all had regional 
ramifications. 
 
Less than a decade before the initiation of the Arab Spring, Iraq witnessed major transitional 
moments: from the US-led occupation in 2003 and the consequent collapse of the state 
institutions, to the eruption of the sectarian civil war 2006-07. Illustrating the extent of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
influence through supporting and arming different fighting factions in both countries. This is discussed further in 
the sections below.  
4 As of May 2016 there are 4.8 million Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. Of this numbers there are 2.1 
million refugees in Jordan, Egypt and Iraq and 2.7 million in Turkey (UNHCR 2016). As of December 2015, it has 
been estimated that among those who stayed in Syria there are 6.5 million Internally Displaced and 72% of the 
population has no access to clean water. For further details on the extent of the humanitarian crisis see the UN’s 
Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 (UNOCHA 2015).  
5 Other countries that have went (or are still going through) constitutional reforms include Libya, Egypt, and 
Yemen.  
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weakening of the Iraqi state, due to over a decade of international sanctions in the 1990s6 and 
the consequent policies post-2003, in June 2014 a multinational Islamist militant group, the 
Islamic State, took control over a vast territory of the country’s eastern and northeastern 
provinces. Inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, protests continue to take place in major 
Iraqi cities demanding better governance, social justice and democratic politics.7 Upon the US-
led occupation of the country in 2003, Iraq became the object of an American state-building 
project. A main aspect of this project was the introduction of democracy as a governance 
method that would transform the country into a regional democratic model. Knowledge about 
the country and the region was translated into more ‘governable’ forms of information by 
international (and especially American) governance experts. The following section will draw 
on examples from the Iraq experience to illustrate the first point in the chapter’s argument on 
the difficulties to extract a critical (regional) perspective on governance due to the nature of 
governance (national, regional, or global level) as a technology of ordering that requires the 
production of abstracted forms of knowledge about the objects that it tries to act upon.  
 
 
5.3 Global Governance and the Processes of Translation - The Necessity of 
 Abstraction 
 
Global governance as an organizing term is a product of the post-Cold War era that came to 
reflect the internationalization of certain issues, for instance, democracy and human rights. 
While a conceptual and normative consensus on what the term means is absent, the underlying 
consensus is that the term tries to capture (attempts at) the creation and/or maintenance of a 
certain global order. The scale of such a process necessarily makes it difficult or impossible to 
render visible localized histories and politics. The possibility of having a counter-perspective 
seems to require the same or similar level of abstraction as the ‘global’. 
  
                                                        
6 For an account of the sanctions regime as a form of intervention and its ramifications on the ground, see Sarah 
Graham Brown (1999).  
7 More recently the Iraqi Parliament was stormed by protesters 
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The meaning of global governance at both the conceptual and normative levels has been 
contested by international relations scholars since its emergence in the 1990s.8 One of the 
earliest definitions is by James N. Rosenau who defined it as describing ‘systems of rule at all 
levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the 
pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions’ (Rosenau 1995, 
p.13). The term has since been elaborated on. One of the latest, and perhaps most standard 
definitions, is by Thomas G. Weiss who understood global governance as ‘the sum of the 
informal and formal values, norms, procedures, and institutions, that help all actors – states, 
intergovernmental organizations, civil society, transnational corporations, and individuals – to 
identify, understand, and address trans-boundary problems’ (Weiss 2013, p. 2). 
 
The normative and conceptual critiques of global governance as a practice and an organizing 
term are varied and are thoroughly discussed in Andrew Hurrell’s contribution to this volume 
and in his work On Global Order (2007). A number of these critiques are concerned with the 
inability of global governance to capture particularities that are themselves objects of global 
governance’s ordering:  
 
the rhetoric of ‘order’ and ‘governance’ can easily lead to an exaggerated belief 
in the possibility of a neat, tidy arrangement of political life that is unlikely 
within domestic society and deeply implausible beyond it. It implies an image of 
politics that is very hard to reconcile with the immense complexity of the global 
system, with the multiplicity of logics — of power, of interest, and of identity — 
that operate within it, and with the dynamism and unpredictability of the forces 
that shape it (Hurrell 2007, p. 20). 
 
This ‘belief in the possibility of a neat, tidy arrangement of political life’ is, we argue, a 
necessary condition for any intervention that aims at a large scale of ordering. To make 
possible the introduction of a method of governance that would connect various local points in 
a globalized, regionalized, or universalized form, it is necessary to abstract the local into 
                                                        
8 For an early discussion of the conceptual ambiguity and normative problems see Lawrence S. Finkelstein (1995). 
For a comprehensive and recent discussion, see Andrew Hurrell (2007).  
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measurable and knowable categories. This uniformity and standardization of categories is a 
necessary condition that allows the drafting of policies which embed methods of measuring 
impact and success. This is a practice that is essential for making decisions on, for example, 
how to channel developmental funds, or how to control and preempt the spread of epidemics, 
or how to best produce an environment suitable for seamless global market transactions.9  
These processes of ‘translating’ local experience into abstracted and standardized policy 
objectives are not exclusive to ‘global’ or ‘regional’ governance processes, but are present in 
all forms of ordering collective lives.10 
 
In Iraq, this process of translation took place around the same time as the US was preparing to 
intervene in the political structure of the country. Upon the US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003, 
the United States initiated a state-building project that ushered new possibilities, including the 
democratization of a country that was ruled for decades by an authoritarian regime.11  The 
translation took place in academic as well as policy circles, abstracting knowledge that was 
produced by regional and country scholars into neat and tidy categories that can be compared 
globally.  
 
Policy experts and scholars identified Iraq’s dependency on oil revenues as the country’s main 
obstacle to establishing a democratic system.12 Iraq, like many other countries in the Middle 
East, was considered a ‘rentier state’: a state that relies on oil revenues as the main source of its 
                                                        
9 For a discussion on how knowledge about a particular locality is produced and translated into abstract facts and 
hypotheses along the policy pipelines of local actors, international consultants and international organizations in 
the context of development, see Richard Rottenburg (2009).  
10 This is true of state methods of ordering, including the census, urban planning, public health policies and so on. 
For examples see: on the state-led mega projects and the connection between the modernist epistemology of 
ordering and state power, see James Scott (1999); on the politics of the census and the creation/ politicization of 
racial identities in the United States and Brazil, see Melissa Nobles (2000); On the relation between modern 
statistics and knowledge and power of government see Alain Desrosières (2000). 
11 See for example memoirs of participants in the Coalition Provisional Authority such as Bremer (2006); Stewart 
(2006); Diamond (2005).  
12 See for example a roundtable that brought together some of the most prominent experts on Iraq and on oil 
rentierism (Open Society Institute and the London School of Economics 2005). 
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income. Oil revenues are considered a form of rent because they do not involve any elaborate 
form of economic production activities. The rentier states of the Middle East inspired an 
approach among scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, generally known as the Rentier State theses. 
The general claim of this approach is that oil-dependent states are not democratic because oil 
rent allows them to be autonomous from society, thus unaccountable via taxation, and allows 
them to use oil funds to either buy consent through populist policies or patronage, or suppress 
and deter opposition through state violence that is funded by oil money. 
 
Originally this framework emerged to address problems of economic growth within the 
framework of state-led development in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s (Mahdavy 1970). It 
later developed to include problems with authoritarianism in the Arab world as they were 
linked to questions of economic development (Luciani 2001; Beblawi 1990).13 Others have 
looked at the role of oil in the construction of state autonomy above social networks (Skocpol 
1994), and another trend focused on oil’s historical role in the production of weak institutional 
state capacity (Chaudhry 1997). This literature, originally produced mainly by political 
economists of the Middle East, was revisited by US-based political science scholars in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Their findings were published in very prestigious mainstream American 
political science journals. The claim of the existence of a link between oil and authoritarianism 
was subjected to large-N regressions that tested whether oil ‘hinders democracy’.14 Democracy 
and the ‘oil economy’ were broken down into multiple variables that can be represented by 
numerical indicators and placed on regression charts to test the correlation between oil and 
democracy across a number of countries spread across the world. This was done in an attempt 
to legitimize the claim and incorporate this literature into a wider range of works on the 
resource-curse and democratization (Ross 1999; 2001; Smith 2004).15 
 
                                                        
13 Beblawi became the Egyptian Interim Prime Minister (2013 – March 2014) after the 2011 Egyptian uprising 
14 I am borrowing the title of Michael L. Ross’s article (2001).  
15 The rentier state theses have been argued to be one of the very few theoretical contributions of Middle Eastern 
Studies to the discipline of political science (Anderson 1987). However, what I refer to here is the adaptation of 
conclusions from this literature into mainstream political science studies as part of larger global concerns with 
democratization and democratic politics rather than the recognition of this literature in political science and 
political economy works on the resource curse.  
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The translation of knowledge that is required by the large scale intervention of democracy 
builders is very clear. In their 1970s and 1980s versions, the rentier state theses were written 
with a heavy qualitative interpretation relying on particular contexts. As such they often stayed 
within the realm of Middle Eastern studies. Only in the late 1990s and early 2000s did we 
witness their discovery by mainstream US political science scholars. Their discovery was not 
accompanied by further investigation of the region’s history, rather the conclusions of the 
earlier studies were broken down into variables that were then subjected to regression tests 
which fed into additional variables from other studies of oil rich countries. The histories and the 
particularities were no longer necessary in face of statistical calculations that affirmed and/ or 
negated correlations. It is now a story that is universally understandable  ̶  as long as one is able 
to read regression charts. This interest in renewing ‘old’ Middle Eastern studies concepts was 
probably a response to the pressing questions facing US policy-makers regarding Iraq and the 
Middle East. It was also around the same time, in 2003, that President George W. Bush 
initiated his administration’s ‘forward strategy of freedom’ to promote democracy throughout 
the Middle East. Democracy promotion was an official policy funded by State Department 
projects.  
 
The revival of the interest in producing knowledge about oil and democracy was at the same 
time occurring in the more critical scholarship of Middle Eastern studies. These studies often 
point not to oil rent, as the direct cause of non-democratic politics, but to processes of oil 
production and circulation as they connect with global historical conjunctures and possibilities 
of democratic politics. For example, democratic struggles in which oil workers played a critical 
role in Saudi Arabia (1950s and early 1960s) were systematically crushed by ARAMCO, a 
Standard Oil company, in collaboration with the Saudi government, directly borrowing 
techniques that were used in Jim Crow America16 (Vitalis 2007). Another study illustrates how 
methods of organizing the coal industry made possible the emergence of militant labor 
movements in Europe that were able to successfully employ methods to jeopardize wealth 
production (such as the general strike and sabotage). These labor movements consequently led 
                                                        
16 The Jim Crow system refers to policies of racial segregation in the United States that lasted from the 1890s until 
the 1960s. For a history of this era see C. Vann Woodward (2002). I thank Daniel Kato for suggesting this 
reference.  
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to European mass democratic politics. In contrast, methods of social organization that are made 
possible by the production, distribution and circulation of oil and oil wealth, forms of financial 
networks, militarism and technologies have undermined the success of democratic movements 
in oil producing countries. Oil extraction, unlike coal, does not rely upon workers developing 
closely-held experiential knowledge about how to extract it, and oil can be transported in 
various ways (pipelines and tankers on ships and trucks) that are less vulnerable to organized 
collective action and sabotage by labor (Mitchell 2011). An older but a classic study of Iraqi 
political and social movements illustrates that contrary to a rentier state thesis regarding the 
cooptation of contentious politics by the state’s employment of oil rent, Iraq witnessed a series 
of labor and political battles, with democratic demands, that involved attempts to disrupt the 
flow of Iraqi oil (Batatu 1978, pp. 866-936). Once we shift our analytical attention from oil rent 
to the political economy and history of oil, it appears that what oil hinders is the success of 
these democratic movements rather than their emergence in the first place.   
 
More fundamentally to the questions of governance, what these critical studies show is that the 
knowledge that is would allow us to understand the particularities of power relations in global 
processes (such as the political economy of oil) and to see the articulations of politics of 
descent and critique, requires empirically detailed, localized and historicized investigation. In 
other words, it requires a process of de-translation, i.e. a process of undoing the abstract. The 
knowledge that is needed to introduce and maintain order requires a translation of local 
knowledge into abstracted and universalized categories that are comparable across all objects of 
that ordering thus loosing along the way the critiques. In other words, any knowledge that 
offers a counter perspective or a critical perspective to the global is un-governable, not 
conducive to the imperatives of governance. As such, to speak of a regional governance 
perspective is to place one set of abstractions alongside another, not to produce a critical 
perspective. Consequently, a critical perspective is necessarily un-governable.  
 
5.4 A Problem of Representation 
 
This section addresses the second part of this chapter’s argument: that a regional governance 
structure, might give an appearance of a coherent perspective. However, this is not a critical 
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perspective as it hardly reflects the perspective of the populations governed. While a region 
may seem like a coherent unit through policies and decisions of regional governance bodies, 
regional politics and life, which are the source of the critique, are not as clearly defined and 
thus cannot produce a unitary or coherent perspective. 
 
Regional governance bodies tend to reflect the inter-state dynamics within a region, rather than 
critical perspectives of the governed. This is clear from the other contributions in this volume. 
For example, in Tieku and Gelot’s account of an African perspective on global governance, it is 
clear that despite attempts to codify and incorporate popular participation in regional 
governance within the African Union, matters that are considered of strategic importance are all 
decided upon by representatives of the member states rather than by channels of popular 
participation. Thus, extracting a perspective from the Union’s actions will necessarily reflect 
that of the member states rather than those who are governed. A perspective of governance 
bodies rather than those who are governed, I suggest, cannot be critical. Both of Belokurova’s 
account of a Russian perspective and Thapan and Sharma’s account of an Indian perspective 
highlight the significance of hegemonic regional politics in understanding a regional 
perspective. In both accounts we see the dominance of a regional super power’s agenda of 
maintaining a certain regional order. These dynamics are ones that hardly reflect the 
perspective of the governed, and is more telling of inter-state politics. This is also clear in 
Sanahuja’s contribution to this volume on Latin America, where the persistence of nationalism 
and national sovereignty of each state complicates regional integration and governance. A 
counter-hegemonic perspective, for example, to a competing regional power like China in the 
case of India or the perceived “West” in many other regional examples, is not necessarily a 
critical perspective.17 It is especially the case that if we look for a counter perspective in 
governance practices or structures that counter-hegemonic perspective generally attempts to 
replace one hegemonic discourse by another rather than offer a critical perspective.    
 
In terms of governance structures, the Middle East has often been understood to have relatively 
low levels of regional integration, thus making it difficult to recognize a counter-hegemonic 
regional perspective. Focusing mainly on the Arab League, the region’s oldest and biggest 
                                                        
17 I am indebted to Nehal Bhuta for alerting me to this point.  
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regional governance body, one widely cited argument attributes low regional integration in the 
Middle East to a problem of political will of member states. These states, on this view, are 
more interested in asserting regional hegemony and preserving sovereign power leading them 
to draft and maintain an institutional design which is unconducive to regional integration 
(Barnett and Solingen 2007). But in a classic study, Ian S. Lustick argues that cases of high 
regional integration, like Europe, were historically conditioned by wars of conquest that lead to 
the emergence of regional hegemons. It is the inability of any state in the Middle East, rather 
than the lack of political will, to emerge as a regional hegemon that has led to these levels of 
low regional integration. Historically, regional hegemons emerged as a result of cross-border 
warfare. The Middle East states, due to historical sequencing, like other post-colonial states 
arrived at an international system that is already populated with powerful actors and 
international norms that make the recurrence of wars of conquest, that have historically helped 
consolidate the powers of many western states, unthinkable (Lustick 1997). 
 
The unexceptional case of the Arab League can also be seen through an empirically based 
survey of the League’s effectiveness in mitigating conflict resolution in wars and violent 
conflicts in the Middle East over the span of 60 years (1948-2008) (Pinfari 2009). The study 
offers an extensive review of the literature on the weakness of the Arab League as a regional 
conflict mediator and compares the evidence used in this literature to the results of its survey. 
Contrary to the popular argument that the institutions of the League were built to fail, the 
survey shows that the League had more successes than is normally attributed to it in conflict 
mitigation. The League succeeded in promoting at least partial settlement in 40 percent of 
boundary wars and political crises. Its failure is mainly in mediating most inter-state wars in the 
region because “one of the major warring parties was not, with few exceptions, a member state 
[of the League].” (Ibid., p. 2) The dominance of regional power dynamics over the ability of the 
League to intervene is also obvious in its failure to intervene in civil wars when a regional 
power was involved. This point is consistent with Lustick’s argument regarding the 
predominance of establishing regional hegemony historically prior to the establishment of 
constrains that would allow for regional integration.   
 
The League is the oldest regional governance body in the Middle Easter. It was founded in 
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March 1945 by six states: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt). Today, 
the League includes twenty two states making it the largest regional governance body in the 
region in terms of its membership size.  Clearly, the organization is not inclusive of the whole 
region. Three of the regional powers are not Arab countries and are thus not members of the 
League: Iran, Israel, and Turkey. While the League was initiated as a pan-Arabist organization, 
its politics, scope, meaning, and actions over time reflected the regional dynamics that went 
through considerable changes. These developments included the shift of focus on security 
issues after the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel, the suspension of Egypt’s 
membership for eleven years due to its unilateral decision to sign a peace agreement with Israel 
in 1979. The 1980s have also witnessed the emergence of sub-regional governance bodies 
highlighting the decline of a pan-Arabist project in favor of arrangements that are not motivated 
by ideological reasons.  
 
The Arab Spring has brought more changes at the regional scene, including the emergence of 
new regional actors and the weakening of others. These processes, it can be argued, were 
already in motion prior to the wave of 2011 uprisings. In 2010 André Bank and Morten 
Valbjørn wrote of the necessity of incorporating the local level when studying the regional 
politics of the Middle East. Their study led them to conclude that the region was now in a New 
Arab Cold War (Bank and Valbjørn  2010).18 Signs of this New Cold War became apparent in 
the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon, which produced opposing and differing 
responses in the Arab Middle East. The war “did not translate into much consensus on the exact 
nature of regional politics” and revealed that ‘[s]ocietal actors, not upstart republics, now 
represent the challenge to the regional status quo’ (Bank and Valbjørn  2010, pp. 311-12). 
  
                                                        
18 The height of pan-Arabism was in the 1950s and 1960s when new revolutionary republican regimes took power 
in a number of key Arab states, including Iraq, Egypt and Syria. These republics generally upheld Arab 
nationalism as one of their main defining political identities and ambitions. However, during this period, the region 
witnessed a major split between these republics and traditional, conservative monarchies. The two camps were far 
from being internally unified, especially at the republican end where competition over regional influence defined 
the politics of the time. This period is now known in academic circles by a term coined in 1965 as the Arab Cold 
War (Kerr 1971).  
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This term has circulated since then to describe the increasingly complicated regional scene 
post-2011. The region has been immersed in an unprecedented large number of internal and 
inter-regional conflicts in its modern history. This is particularly the case in the Arab Middle 
East which has seen a civil war in Syria, increased sectarian tension in Iraq and Lebanon, two 
separate governments in Libya, political instability in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen, and 
continued tensions and violence on the Palestinian-Israeli front as well as between Israel and 
the armed wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah party along the Israeli-Lebanese borders. Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran have emerged as the main regional powers and have been 
involved in battles over spheres of influence in the region. The alliances among these countries 
have not been consistent – while two countries may support one political faction in a third 
country, they may differ in whom they support (logistically and financially) in a fourth country 
and can be involved in a proxy war. While shifting alliances exist in all regions, in the current 
Middle East, they have resulted in flaring armed violence, civil, proxy wars, and even direct 
military interventions most notably the on-going Saudi-led Arab coalition that has been 
carrying air strikes in Yemen. At the same time, the increasing numbers and power of cross-
national political religious groups, of different Islamic sects, that have been recruiting 
volunteers and fighters of different nationalities (including European) to fight most visibly in 
Syria, Iraq and Libya have also added an additional layer to the regional power scene. These 
groups have emerged as new players, alongside states, in the battles to redefine the political 
map of the Middle East.19 The massive regional political upheaval’s impact on the scope and 
meaning of regional governance is still to be determined, leading a number of scholars to 
stipulate the new nature of the new emerging regime (see for example, Beck 2015). Whatever 
the new regional regime might result in in terms of amending regional governance bodies, it 
will, as argued above in connection to other contributions in this volume, only reflect the 
perspective of the emerging powers within the member states rather than of those who are 
governed.  
  
5.5 A Cultural Perspective? 
 
                                                        
19 For a discussion of the alliances and new politics of the Middle East in light of the New Arab Cold War and 
post-Arab Spring, see for example: Khoury (2013); Ryan (2012); Gause (2014). 
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As Andrew Hurrell argues in this volume, a concern with cultural perspective, important as it 
is, does not help us understand power relations as they operate both in the academy and in 
practices of governance. While acknowledging a form of western hegemony in dominant 
historical and theoretical narratives about the world, he importantly points out that often times 
critiques that attempt to de-centre the west, end-up with static categories of space and a unified 
representation of western power, US hegemony and neo-liberal globalization. Focusing on the 
politics of culture, as suggested by Hurrell, this section illustrates how in the context of the 
Middle East, culture has been a site for political contestation in academic as well as policy 
hallways. These contestations also illustrate how culture, as it relates to governance practices 
and knowledge production, is not simply specific to geographical boundaries, but can also 
assume a professional identity – the culture of experts in this case.  
 
Before turning into the discussion on culture in the Middle East, it might be useful to elaborate 
on the invention of the Middle East as geographical space. This innovation, as will become 
clear, has always been connected to attempts to create governance space rather than to reflect a 
natural geographic space. To say that the Middle East was invented should not imply that the 
invention covers something that is ‘more authentic’. What it means is that once what 
constitutes a certain region is investigated empirically, a less coherent picture emerges making 
it difficult to speak of a perspective on governance that stems from that supposedly obvious 
entity. 
 
The precise contemporary geographical region that the term ‘Middle East’ refers to varies 
according to the source. Egypt, for example, is included in the UN’s map of the Middle East 
region but not of that of the CIA World Factbook.20 A standard academic textbook on the 
history and political economy of the Middle East defines its regional boundaries as: 
 
the twenty states of the Arab League (less Mauritania and Somalia), Iran, Israel 
                                                        
20 The CIA World Factbook (2013) includes the area between Georgia, Azerbaijan and Iran on the east to Israel/ 
Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey in the west and north west as well as the whole Arab peninsula. The UN’s 
map (2011) of the region stretches from Egypt in the west to Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east, 
Turkey in the north to the Arab peninsula, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia in the south.  
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and Turkey. This is more or less the same region known in Britain as the Near 
and Middle East until the Second World War, after which reference to the Near 
East was officially dropped in Britain … following a wartime lead from Winston 
Churchill. (Owen 2004, p. x) 
  
This ambiguity of what states the Middle East region includes, which is true for other regions 
in the world including Europe, could arguably be due to the fact that the term is constantly 
defined by techno-political agendas rather than clearly defined and/ or pre-existing cultural or 
geographical parameters. The term was first coined in 1902 by an American navy captain, 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who referred to the Persian Gulf as the ‘Middle East’ — a region that 
Britain had to secure if it wanted to protect the paths that link the Suez Canal to India. This was 
seen as important because of increased German and Russian influence in this region, including 
a German plan to build a railway line connecting Berlin to Baghdad (Scheffler 2003, p. 264). 
Concern about how this railway might affect India’s secure geopolitical position was what a 
year later gave birth to the term the ‘Middle Eastern Question’. The London Times published a 
series on this topic discussing the dangerousness of Russian and German advances in the 
region. The Middle East, this time, included a larger number of countries, including Persia and 
Nepal among others, countries that seemed to provide a ‘security belt’ for India. Scheffler 
describes how the region was labeled: 
 
Defined like this, the “Middle East” was not a “historical region” in itself, but 
rather an abstract space encompassing a heterogeneous blend of landscapes and 
countries, the common denominator of which happened to be their location at 
the western and northern approaches to India. (Scheffler 2003, p. 265) 
 
The first official institutionalization of the ‘Middle East’ as a term was during the First World 
War when Britain saw it necessary to break-up the Ottoman Empire and replace it with new 
entities that would be under the British sphere of imperial influence. But having to adhere to 
the principle of national self-determination that had become a popular international norm at the 
time, the new space that would replace the Ottoman Empire had to be constituted by 
independent entities.  In 1921 the British Secretary for Colonies, Winston Churchill, created the 
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Middle East Department which was to supervise Iraq, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Aden. 
During World War II, the British Army established the ‘Middle East Command’ in 1939 that 
had authority over an expansive area that also included Greece, Crete, Malta and Iran among 
others (Scheffler 2003, pp. 265-68). 
 
Prior to 1914 what came to be known and ‘institutionalized’ as the Middle East, was more 
commonly referred to as ‘Asiatic Turkey’. A government funded propaganda machine was put 
in charge of representing ‘Asiatic Turkey’ as the ‘Middle East’ — a region of ‘oppressed 
historical nations, the Arabs, Jews, and Armenians, who were on the verge of a remarkable 
renaissance following their liberation and future tutelage by Britain and the entente. … 
Nationalism was thus brought to the very centre of justification for empire’ (Renton 2007, p. 
647). 
 
The effort to destroy the Ottoman Empire was led by British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George, who was interested in protecting the Suez Canal and the path to India as previously 
mentioned. In 1917 he ordered the initiation of a propaganda campaign, named ‘The Turks 
Must Go’, in Britain and in the Allied and neutral countries as well as in the region itself. 
Nationalism, the framing idea of this campaign, not only was an adherence to the principle of 
national self-determination, but also a counter to German and Turkish backed pan-Islamic and 
anti-British propaganda (Renton 2007, p. 247-8; 651). Most of this propaganda was managed 
by Sir Mark Sykes, who was convinced ‘that the principle of nationality was the only basis for 
a stable post-war Near East’. He had popularized the term ‘Middle East’ which while 
geographically ill-defined at the time, was significant for what it represented, ‘a revived 
nationalized landscape between East and West, that was to be free from Ottoman despotism 
and would achieve redemption under Allied protection’ (Ibid., p. 652-53). The propaganda 
campaign, which accompanied British advancements in Ottoman territories included inventions 
of objects of national symbolism where they did not exist. For example, the Arab national flag 
that was eventually adopted by the Arab army, led by Sherif Hussein of Mecca, during the Arab 
Revolt against the Ottomans.  
 
The British invention of the Middle East took a life of its own very quickly. Anti-British revolts 
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emerged in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt within less than five years of the initiation of the 
propaganda campaign. While a governable region from the British perspective did not emerge, 
regional politics emerged very quickly partly as a result of the British intervention and partly 
due to political movements that were occurring before and/ or independent of this intervention. 
The invention, elaboration and popularization of the term ‘Middle East’ was a product of 
international imperial struggles. But the invention of this space does not mean that it hides 
something that is more authentic. It only highlights the phenomena that once what constitutes a 
certain region is investigated empirically, a less coherent picture emerges making it extremely 
difficult to speak of a perspective on governance that stems from a supposedly obvious entity.  
 
‘Culture’ like ‘region’ is not a pre-existing object, but rather a construct of knowledge or 
governance. The emergence of culture as a unit of study is part of the trajectory of the 
emergence of disciplines in the social sciences, particularly anthropology. The politics of 
culture in the context of the Middle East is connected both to the politics of academic 
productions and of political interventions. For instance, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, the 
role of the CIA during the Cold War in exerting influence over cultural production (such as 
sponsoring academic projects and public cultural productions such as magazines and 
periodicals) is now known and documented (Mitchell 2002, pp. 7-15). 
  
The politics of connecting culture to a specific spatial imaginative is perhaps most apparent in 
what came to be known as ‘area studies’. While British imperial ambitions at the turn of the 
twentieth century have contributed to the construction of the ‘Middle East’ as a region, the rise 
of American global power made it an important hub for the study of the Middle East. What is 
known as area studies – interdisciplinary academic studies of world regions, typically non-
Western, have a long and well documented history in the United States.21 Middle Eastern 
                                                        
21 For examples on works on the history of area studies and their connection to the emergence of disciplines see 
Szanton (2002) and Rafael (1994). For a historical account on the emergence of Middle Eastern studies see 
Lockman (2009). For a theoretical treatment of Middle Eastern area studies see Teti (2009), wherein Teti argues 
that area studies can only emerge simultaneously with disciplines as part of social sciences’ specific organization 
of knowledge production. 
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studies went through a number of significant shifts that illustrate the strong intersection of the 
production of knowledge, culture and politics.  
 
The 1967 war, in which Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank, led to a dramatic change in 
the configuration of Middle Eastern studies in the US that targeted, among other things, what is 
understood as the ‘culture’ of the region. A group of US scholars of Arab origins realized in the 
aftermath of the war that ‘the scholars speaking about the Middle East in the United States, 
even the minority who seemed sympathetic to the Arab world, were not from the region and did 
not speak for the region’ (Mitchell 2002, p. 12). These scholars set up a new regional studies 
association and an affiliated journal. Notably among these scholars were Ibrahim Abu-Lughod 
and Edward Said who published the Arab Studies Quarterly ‘and supported research that 
defined the Arab world, rather than the Middle East, as the region of a study. Their aim was 
[to] challenge the premise of Middle Eastern Studies that ‘The Middle East’ was a single 
cultural region’ (Ibid,, p. 12).22 The assumption that the Middle East formed a cultural unity in 
Middle Eastern studies was drawn from its scholarly predecessor – Oriental Studies. This 
assumption, among many other aspects of studying the Middle East, came under severe 
scrutiny by the late 1970s (Mitchell 2002, pp. 12-15).  
 
While histories of social sciences and their origins in particular Western cultures are 
documented by a number of scholars (Chakrabarty 2000), questions about governance as a 
current technology of ordering collectivities can also be addressed through a focus on the 
culture of ‘experts’. In the fall of 2003, few months after the invasion of Iraq, US President 
George W. Bush gave a speech in which he initiated a ‘forward strategy of freedom’ in the 
Middle East. In his speech, he addressed cultural questions, 
 
Some skeptics of democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable 
to the representative government. This ‘cultural condescension’, as Ronald 
Reagan termed it, has a long history ... Time after time, observers have 
questioned whether this country, or that people, or this group, are ‘ready’ for 
democracy – as if freedom were a prize you win for meeting our own Western 
                                                        
22 Emphasis added.   
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standards of progress. In fact, the daily work of democracy itself is the path of 
progress ... It should be clear to all that Islam – the faith of one-fifth of humanity 
– is consistent with democratic rule. (Bush 2003) 
 
One could object to the idea that Islam is the culture of the Middle East or that Islamic cultures 
are uniform. But what is additionally interesting is the translation of this strategy into scientific 
knowledge. By constructing large database sets, cultural attitudes towards democracy, among 
other ‘variables’, were measured and represented in statistical terms by the leading 
investigators of the Arab Barometer Project. This project was established in 2005 by scholars in 
the Arab World and the United States, including the universities of Michigan and Princeton in 
the US and academic, policy and statistical centers in Jordan, Palestine, Morocco, Algeria and 
Kuwait. Two of the main leaders of this project are Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler—political 
scientists at the universities of Princeton and Michigan respectively. In a co-authored article, 
they wrote that a successful project of democratization, ‘requires a citizenry that values 
democracy and possesses the elements of a democratic political culture’ (Tessler and Jamal as 
cited in Mitchell 2011, p. 4). Culture, democratic culture to be precise, is now not only subject 
to measurement, but is also assumed to be a cause for democratic politics. However, there is no 
historical evidence that democracy was ever made possible due to cultural attitudes. According 
to Mitchell, ‘In many cases, the civic virtues that dominant political classes possessed provided 
the grounds on which to oppose democratization’ (Mitchell 2011, p. 4). 
  
Culture is a terrain of conflict in which attempts to define and fix it necessarily stem from 
contending political positions rather than a pre-existing reality. Taking a cultural perspective 
does not necessarily clarify in any way a perspective that is critical or more representative of a 
region. As illustrated by the move of Arab-American scholars in the late 1960s, a politically 
more critical perspective of culture is one that sees it as not unitary but as multiple. Relying on 
cultural representations to seek or clarify paths for political action (of which governance is one) 
can also, as pointed out by Mitchell and Hurrell, lead to positions that are complacent with the 
status quo that one seeks to change.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
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The main argument of this chapter is that a critical regional perspective is not possible to 
extract through regional governance bodies, but rather through empirical daily political lives of 
the governed, is mostly visible in the Middle East. While a regional counter (hegemonic) 
perspective might be available through the actions of regional governance bodies, a critical 
perspective that reflects the political aspirations and cultural manifestations of those who are 
governed, cannot be extracted at a scale as large as a “region.” While this argument is mostly 
apparent in the Middle East due to the relatively weak regional integration and the recent 
regional upheavals, once put in a comparative historical perspective it becomes clear that it 
does not reflect a Middle East exceptionalism but rather a more general observation. 
 
The problem is fundamentally connected to the politics of knowledge about the world. 
Governance, like any other form of ordering politics and lives, can only rely on abstracted 
forms of knowledge about the objects that it attempts to order. Each level of abstraction 
involves a certain kind of translation (of particularities into abstracts). We attempted to 
illustrate how in order to understand the particularities of power relations, which are key to 
constructing a counter perspective, an empirically detailed, localized and historicized 
investigation is required. This process of de-translation renders the knowledge produced 
necessarily un-governable, especially at a level as abstract as a ‘region’.  
 
A region as a geographical space is not a clear or a pre-existing object. A region may seem like 
a coherent unit in policy terms, however, regional politics and life are not as clearly defined and 
thus cannot be the source of a coherent perspective. The Middle East as a distinct region was 
imagined in the early twentieth century as a product of international imperial struggles. It was 
imagined, not as a reflection of a preexisting reality, but as a governance construct. The 
invention of this space does not mean, however, that it hides something that is more authentic. 
As the history of the region shows, colonial interventions were quickly challenged by some of 
the arrangements that they have initially set-up or encouraged. The intervention became part of 
the history and politics of the region and not simply an intruding episode. In short, even though 
the ‘region’ can be traced to a colonial representation, the Middle East as a political space is 
neither meaningless nor artificial. The meaning of its regional politics and geographical 
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boundaries are constantly subject to contestation. As such drawing a coherent regional 
perspective, based on regional politics, becomes an extremely difficult task.  
 
Finally, adopting a cultural regional perspective is politically problematic. Culture is hardly a 
unified or clear category and is a terrain of contestation. Trying to define a regional cultural 
perspective on governance does not clarify or give a more representative view of a region. 
Fixing a terrain of contestation would necessarily lead to a form of status quo which is exactly 
what one tries to avoid when interested in a democratic and de-centered governance outcome. 
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